| 基于委托代理理论的非效率投资行为述评——以融资方式为主线 |
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| 引用本文： | 李胜楠. 基于委托代理理论的非效率投资行为述评——以融资方式为主线[J]. 中南财经政法大学学报, 2008, 0(4) |
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| 作者姓名： | 李胜楠 |
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| 作者单位： | 天津大学,管理学院,天津,300072 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家社会科学基金 , 天津市社会科学基金 |
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| 摘 要： | 在现代财务理论体系下,由于委托代理冲突和信息不对称的存在,融资方式的选择将会影响到公司的投资效率。本文分别对新权益融资、内源融资和负债融资下,就委托代理冲突而导致的非效率投资问题进行了较系统的梳理和评论。在此基础上指出我国此类研究的不足主要在于忽视了我国资本市场特有的制度背景,对"完美资本市场"限制条件的不断放松为进一步的研究提供了思路。
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| 关 键 词： | 权益融资 内源融资 负债融资 委托代理冲突 非效率投资 |
Review of Inefficient Investment Behaviors based on the Principal-agent Theory: An Aspect of Financing Methods |
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| LI Sheng-nan. Review of Inefficient Investment Behaviors based on the Principal-agent Theory: An Aspect of Financing Methods[J]. Journal of Zhongnan University of Finance and Economics, 2008, 0(4) |
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| Authors: | LI Sheng-nan |
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| Abstract: | In the modern theory of the finance,due to principal-agent conflict and asymmetric infor- mation,the choice of financing methods will affect the company's investment efficiency.From the aspect of equity financing,internal financing and debt financing,this paper collects and analyzes the inefficient investment incurred by the different principal-agent conflicts.Finally,we point out the main weakness of current research on inefficient investment behavior in China is ignoring the unique institutional environment of Chinese capital maker.Relaxing the restrictive conditions of perfect cap- ital market provides the scheme for future research. |
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| Keywords: | Equity Financing Internal Financing Debt Financing Principal-agent Conflict Inefficient Investment |
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