| 复杂产品系统合作创新博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 戴大双,谭崇梅,常静.复杂产品系统合作创新博弈分析[J].技术经济,2013(5):6-10. |
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| 作者姓名： | 戴大双 谭崇梅 常静 |
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| 作者单位： | 大连理工大学管理与经济学部,辽宁大连116024 |
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| 基金项目： | “十一五”国防基础科研重大专项“数字化敏捷制造管理模式及业务流程再造”（D0420060521-11） |
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| 摘 要： | 运用博弈理论,建立并分析了复杂产品系统合作创新的单次博弈模型和重复博弈模型。得出:在一次性合作的情况下,系统集成商的奖励难以有效激励合作单位积极合作,而惩罚可促使合作单位选择积极合作;在长期合作关系下,系统集成商可结合奖惩制度并利用声誉机制来约束合作单位的机会主义行为。
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| 关 键 词： | 复杂产品系统 合作创新 博弈分析 |
Theoretical Analysis on Game of Cooperative Innovation in Complex Product System |
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| Dai Dashuang,Tan Chongmei,Chang Jing.Theoretical Analysis on Game of Cooperative Innovation in Complex Product System[J].Technology Economics,2013(5):6-10. |
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| Authors: | Dai Dashuang Tan Chongmei Chang Jing |
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| Institution: | (Faculty of Management and Economies, Dalian University of Technology, Dalian Liaoning 116024,China) |
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| Abstract: | Using the game theory,this paper constructs and analyzes the one-shot and repeated game models of cooperative innovation in com- plex product system. In the case of one-off cooperation,it shows that the reward could not encourage cooperative units effectively, while the pun- ishment could urge them to cooperate actively. On the other hand, when the system integrator establishes a long-term cooperative relationship with their cooperative units, they could supervise and restrict the opportunistic behaviors of cooperative units by taking advantage of all the mechanisms of reward, punishment and reputation. |
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| Keywords: | complex product system cooperative innovation game theory |
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