| 基于“囚徒困境”博弈的防范工程招投标合谋研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 王先甲,肖露.基于“囚徒困境”博弈的防范工程招投标合谋研究[J].技术经济,2013(7):65-68. |
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| 作者姓名： | 王先甲 肖露 |
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| 作者单位： | [1]武汉大学经济与管理学院,武汉430072 [2]武汉科技大学冶金工业工程系统科学湖北省重点实验室,武汉430081 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金重点资助项目“复杂不确定性多主体多目标合作博弈与协商谈判的合作机制与合作模式”（71231007） |
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| 摘 要： | 提出一种防范工程招投标中招标代理与投标人合谋的新策略,即同时派出两个招标代理审查投标人,使两个招标代理陷入"囚徒困境"博弈中以保证其报告真实。进而针对该策略成本太高的缺点,通过使两者处于不对称信息环境下,进一步改进了该"囚徒困境"博弈。据此,只要招标人设定适当的奖励和惩罚机制,就能在一定程度上阻止招标代理与投标人合谋。
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| 关 键 词： | 工程招投标 合谋行为 囚徒困境博弈 |
Analysis on Preventing Collusion in Project Bidding and Tendering Based on Prisoner＇s Dilemma Game |
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| Wang Xianjia,Xiao Lu.Analysis on Preventing Collusion in Project Bidding and Tendering Based on Prisoner＇s Dilemma Game[J].Technology Economics,2013(7):65-68. |
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| Authors: | Wang Xianjia Xiao Lu |
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| Institution: | 1 (1. School of Economics and Management,Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072, China; 2. Hubei Province Key Laboratory of Systems Science in Metallurgical Process,Wuhan University of Science and Technology, Wuhan 430081, China) |
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| Abstract: | This paper proposes a new strategy to prevent the collusion between the bidding agent and the tenderer in project bidding and tende- ring,namely sends two bidding agents to review the tenderer at the same time,and lets them fall into prisonei＇s dilemma game in order to make sure that they report truly. Furthermore,according to the disadvantage of high cost of this strategy,it improves this prisoner＇s dilemma game through making them be in asymmetric information environment. In this case,as long as the bidder sets proper reward and punishment mecha- nism,the problem of the collusion between the bidding agent and the tenderer to a certain extent could be solved. |
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| Keywords: | project bidding and tendering collusion behavior prisoner＇s dilemma game |
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