基于债权治理视角的利益侵占约束博弈分析

运用代理成本理论和契约理论,阐述了控股股东与银行债权人之间利益博弈的机理。针对我国转轨经济时期特殊的经济和社会背景———独特的股权结构、过度的政府干预、较低的社会信任程度等,构建了控股股东与银行债权人之间的利益博弈模型,证明了均衡状态的存在,并通过进一步分析各参数变量的政策含义,搭建了控股股东与银行债权人之间利益博弈的理论分析框架,为研究我国上市公司的银行债权治理提供了新的分析思路。

Game Analysis on Restriction to Benefit Expropriation Theory from Perspective of Creditor Governance

Based on the agency cost theory and the contract theory,this paper explains the mechanism of benefit game between controlling shareholders and bank creditors. Considering the special economic and social background, namely unique ownership structure, excessive government intervention and low social trust degree, it designs the game model between controlling shareholders and bank creditors, which proves the existence of game balance. Through further analyzing the policy implication of variable parameters,it builds the theoretical analysis framework for the benefit game between controlling shareholders and bank creditors, which provides a new perspective for improving the effectiveness of external governance of China＇s listed companies.