A swing state theory of trade protection in the Electoral College |
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Authors: | Mirabelle Muûls Dimitra Petropoulou |
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Institution: | 1. Grantham Institute for Climate Change‐Imperial College Business School, Imperial College London;2. Department of Economics, University of Sussex |
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Abstract: | This paper analyzes trade policy determination in the Electoral College in the presence of swing voters. It determines the circumstances under which incumbent politicians have an incentive to build a reputation for protectionism, thus swaying voting decisions and improving their re‐election probability. Strategic trade protection is shown to be more likely when protectionist swing voters have a lead over free trade supporters in states with relatively strong electoral competition and in states representing a larger proportion of Electoral College votes. An empirical test using a measure of industrial concentration in swing and decisive U.S. states lends support to the theoretical findings. |
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Keywords: | D72 F13 |
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