Intra-Jurisdictional Tax Competition |
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Authors: | Email author" target="_blank">Jonathan?KlickEmail author Francesco?Parisi |
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Institution: | (1) Florida State University College of Law, 425 West Jefferson Street, Tallahassee, FL 32306, USA;(2) George Mason University School of Law, Arlington, VA 22201, USA |
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Abstract: | While much has been written about inter-jurisdictional competition for tax revenues, especially concerning the choice between
harmonization and competition, the literature has largely ignored intra-jurisdiction issues. The few articles examining this
issue focus on how lower level governmental entities react to the tax decisions of a national government. However, in some
instances, multiple co-equal taxing authorities might share the same base. These bodies face a dilemma over whether to harmonize
their policies or to compete. We present a simple model of revenue maximizing tax authorities and derive the conditions under
which harmonization dominates competition. |
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Keywords: | tax federalism harmonization rent-seeking commons |
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