| 信息不对称下的融资博弈 |
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| 引用本文： | 李仁安,王凯. 信息不对称下的融资博弈[J]. 商业研究, 2006, 0(6): 101-104 |
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| 作者姓名： | 李仁安 王凯 |
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| 作者单位： | 武汉理工大学,管理学院管理科学与工程系,湖北,武汉,430070 |
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| 摘 要： | 企业的发展关系到一国经济的发展,而融资则是众多企业面临的最重要的问题。银行贷款是我国企业融资首选,但是由于信息的不对称使得这个过程难以顺利进行。分析在银行拥有不完全信息的情况下,通过对合并均衡、分开均衡以及混合策略均衡的探讨,得出其均衡策略,并给出相应对策。
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| 关 键 词： | 博弈 纳什均衡 信息不对称 融资 |
| 文章编号： | 1001-148X(2006)06-0101-03 |
| 收稿时间： | 2005-03-28 |
| 修稿时间： | 2005-03-28 |
The Financing Game Based on Asymmetrical Information |
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| LI Ren-an,WANG Kai. The Financing Game Based on Asymmetrical Information[J]. Commercial Research, 2006, 0(6): 101-104 |
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| Authors: | LI Ren-an WANG Kai |
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| Affiliation: | School of Management, Wuhan University of Technology, Wuhan, Hubei 430070, China |
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| Abstract: | The development of economics is related to that of one country's enterprises,and financing is the most serious problem which companies have to face.To loan from bank is the first choice for Chinese enterprises,but it is always blocked by asymmetrical information.It analyzes how to guarantee the success of the process while a bank owes asymmetrical information.After the analysis of pooling equilibrium and separating equilibrium and perfect Bayes equilibrium,it works out the equilibrium strategies and gives the practical strategies. |
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| Keywords: | game theory nash equilibrium asymmetrical information financing |
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