Political connections and privatization: Evidence from China |
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Authors: | Guoqian Tu Bingxuan Lin Feng Liu |
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Institution: | 1. College of Economics and Business Administration, Chongqing University, Chongqing 400030, China;2. College of Business Administration, University of Rhode Island, Kingston, RI 02881, United States;3. School of Management, Xiamen University, Xiamen 361005, China;4. Center for Accounting, Finance and Institutions, Sun Yatsen University, Guangzhou 510275, China |
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Abstract: | We examine how the political connections of acquirers influence the process and outcomes of privatization in China. We find that politically connected acquirers receive preferential treatment and acquire higher quality firms during full privatization, and document evidence of post-privatization tunneling from target firms to acquirers. We show that the excessive tunneling by politically connected acquirers is associated with lower performance after privatization. Overall, our results suggest that individuals are likely to abuse their political connections to exploit the opportunities arising from privatization. We recommend that policymakers constrain the influence of political connections in the privatization process. |
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