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信息不对称下供应链上下游企业质量守约博弈分析
引用本文:杜志平,胡贵彦,穆东. 信息不对称下供应链上下游企业质量守约博弈分析[J]. 物流技术, 2011, 0(13): 161-163
作者姓名:杜志平  胡贵彦  穆东
作者单位:北京物资学院物流学院;北京交通大学物流研究院;
摘    要:讨论了在信息不对称情况下,供应链上、下游企业交接货品时质量守约的博弈问题,给出了购买者/供应者非合作博弈的纳什均衡解和多次重复博弈模型。通过模型分析,提出了双方增加质量守约的有效途径。

关 键 词:供应链  博弈分析  质量检验

A Game Analysis of Quality Compliance by Supply Chain Enterprises under Information Asymmetry
DU Zhi-ping,HU Gui-yan,MU Dong. A Game Analysis of Quality Compliance by Supply Chain Enterprises under Information Asymmetry[J]. Logistics Technology, 2011, 0(13): 161-163
Authors:DU Zhi-ping  HU Gui-yan  MU Dong
Affiliation:DU Zhi-ping1,HU Gui-yan1,MU Dong2(1.School of Logistics,Beijing Wuzi University,Beijing 101149,2.Academy of Material Flow,Beijing Jiaotong University,Beijing 100044,China)
Abstract:The paper studies the game problem between supply chain upstream and downstream enterprises when complying with quality guarantees in an environment of information asymmetry,presents the Nash Equilibrium solution to the non-cooperative game problem between the buyers and suppliers as well as the repetitive game model and,through model analysis,offers countermeasures to increase quality compliance on both sides.
Keywords:supply chain  game analysis  quality inspection  
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