| 物流外包相关专用性投资决策和激励合同的优化设计 |
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| 引用本文： | 陈倩倩,李波. 物流外包相关专用性投资决策和激励合同的优化设计[J]. 物流技术, 2011, 0(13): 101-104 |
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| 作者姓名： | 陈倩倩 李波 |
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| 作者单位： | 天津大学管理与经济学部; |
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| 基金项目： | 教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划资助项目(NCET-06-0236);教育部博士点基金资助项目(20100032110034) |
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| 摘 要： | 由于关系专用性投资产生的套牢风险,设计了基于专用性投资的收益共享激励合同;通过对模型的分析优化与计算,得到了信息不对称条件下第三方物流企业的最优专用性资产投资水平和外包企业的最优激励合同设计;分析了合同中影响物流产出分享份额的因素及相互之间的关系,为外包企业对第三方物流企业的激励提供参考。
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| 关 键 词： | 激励合同 专用性投资 套牢风险 物流外包 |
Study on Decision-making and Incentive Contract Design for Relationship-oriented Investment in Logistics Outsourcing |
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| CHEN Qian-qian,LI Bo. Study on Decision-making and Incentive Contract Design for Relationship-oriented Investment in Logistics Outsourcing[J]. Logistics Technology, 2011, 0(13): 101-104 |
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| Authors: | CHEN Qian-qian LI Bo |
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| Affiliation: | CHEN Qian-qian,LI Bo(Department of Management & Economics,Tianjin University,Tianjin 300072,China) |
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| Abstract: | The paper studies the hold-up risk in relationship specific investment and designs its revenue sharing incentive contract.Through analysis,optimization and calculation of the contract,the paper obtains the optimal specific investment level of the 3PL enterprise and the optimal contract terms for the outsourcing company under information asymmetry.At the end,the paper analyzes the factors influencing output sharing in the contract and their inter-relationship. |
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| Keywords: | incentive contract specific investment hold-up risk logistics outsourcing |
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