Does Team-Based Compensation Give Rise to Problems When Agents Vary in Their Ability? |
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Authors: | Claude Meidinger Jean-Louis Rullière Marie-Claire Villeval |
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Institution: | (1) TEAM, CNRS, University Paris I-Panthéon Sorbonne, 106-112 Boulevard de 1'Hôpital, 75013 Paris, France;(2) GATE, CNRS, University Lumière, Lyon 2, 93 chemin des Mouilles, 69130 Ecully, France |
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Abstract: | This paper reports the results of an experiment on how team heterogeneity in terms of productivity influences both the revenue sharing proposed by the principal to the team and the employees' performance. Experimental evidence shows that when the team is heterogeneous, the principal does not try to motivate the agents through her sharing offer. Regardless of the level of team-based compensation, a large amount of free riding occurs since each agent is mainly influenced by his teammate's behavior. In contrast, when the team is homogeneous, agents are better able to cooperate, reciprocating the principal's offer. |
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Keywords: | experiments free riding compensation peer pressure teamwork |
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