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两级物流服务商参与的供应链质量激励机制研究
引用本文:张建军,赵启兰.两级物流服务商参与的供应链质量激励机制研究[J].商业经济与管理,2020,40(5):5-21.
作者姓名:张建军  赵启兰
作者单位:1. 北京交通大学 经济管理学院
2. 内蒙古农业大学 经济管理学院
基金项目:教育部人文社会科学研究一般资助项目;内蒙古社会科学基金项目
摘    要:两级物流服务商参与的供应链存在围绕产品质量以及物流服务质量控制的挑战。基于两级物流服务商参与的供应链质量特殊性设计了零售商主导下静态激励与动态激励相结合、个体单独激励与团队激励相结合的质量激励机制。研究表明:零售商对LSI的物流服务质量激励强度将影响LSI对FLSP的物流服务质量激励强度;制造商、LSI以及FLSP的质量努力水平与委托方对其质量激励强度系数以及其本身的质量努力效果系数成正比,与其各自的质量努力成本系数成反比;由于零售商对制造商以及LSI的团队激励并没有使得制造商与LSI提高产品质量及物流服务质量努力水平,因此,零售商缺乏提供团队激励的积极性;相比静态激励而言,当激励强度调节系数满足一定条件时,动态激励可以提高制造商的质量努力水平和零售商的期望收益;同时,零售商可通过改变激励强度调节系数来平衡自身期望收益最大化与质量努力水平最大化的目标,也即相比静态激励而言,动态激励机制更具优势。

关 键 词:两级物流服务商  供应链质量  静态激励机制  动态激励机制  委托代理理论  
收稿时间:2020-04-19

Research on the Quality Incentive Mechanism of Supply Chain with the Participation of Two-echelon Logistics Service Providers
ZHANG Jianjun ZHAO Qilan.Research on the Quality Incentive Mechanism of Supply Chain with the Participation of Two-echelon Logistics Service Providers[J].Business Economics and Administration,2020,40(5):5-21.
Authors:ZHANG Jianjun ZHAO Qilan
Institution:1. School of Economics and Management, Beijing Jiaotong University
2. School of Economics and Management, Inner Mongolia Agricultural University
Abstract:There are challenges around the quality control of product and logistics service in the supply chain with the participation of two-echelon logistics service providers. Based on the particularity of supply chain quality under the participation of two-echelon logistics service providers, a quality incentive mechanism is designed, which combines static and dynamic incentive mechanism, individual and team incentive mechanism. The results show that the incentive intensity of retailers to LSI will affect the incentive intensity of LSI to FLSP. Compared with individual incentive mechanism, retailers’ team incentive to manufacturers and LSI reduces the quality effort level of the whole supply chain and retailers’ expected revenue; meanwhile the combination of individual and team incentive mechanism does not improve the quality effort level of manufacturer and LSI. Therefore, the retailer lacks the enthusiasm to provide team incentive mechanism. Compared with static incentive mechanism, dynamic incentive mechanism can improve the quality effort level of manufacturer and the expected revenue of the retailer, when the adjustment coefficient of incentive intensity meets certain conditions. At the same time, the retailer can effectively stimulate the reputation effect and weaken the ratchet effect by changing the adjustment coefficient of incentive intensity, so as to balance the goal of maximizing its expected revenue and maximizing the quality effort level of the whole supply chain, that is, compared with the static incentive mechanism, the dynamic incentive mechanism has more advantages.
Keywords:two-echelon logistics service providers  supply chain quality  static incentives mechanism  dynamic incentives mechanism  principal-agent theory  
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