首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
     

创新还是寻租?业绩期望落差对企业风险承担行为的影响
引用本文:何晴晴 杨柳 潘镇. 创新还是寻租?业绩期望落差对企业风险承担行为的影响[J]. 商业经济与管理, 2020, 40(7): 71-85
作者姓名:何晴晴 杨柳 潘镇
作者单位:南京师范大学 商学院
基金项目:国家自然科学基金面上项目
摘    要:基于企业行为理论和参照点理论,探讨了业绩期望落差与企业创新性行为和寻租性行为之间的动态关系,并且考察了CEO权力和独立董事监督的调节作用。利用2013-2018年沪深A股制造业非国有上市公司的数据进行分析,结果发现:当期望参照点占主导地位时,随着业绩落差的增加,企业的长期风险承担意愿增强、短期风险承担意愿减弱,但当生存参照点起主导作用时,企业的长期风险承担意愿减弱,而短期风险承担意愿增强,因此业绩期望落差与创新性行为呈先增加后减少的倒U型关系,而与寻租性行为呈先减少后增加的U型关系。进一步研究发现,CEO权力弱化了业绩期望落差与寻租性行为的U型关系,独立董事监督强化了业绩期望落差与创新性行为的倒U型关系。研究深化了对业绩落差状态下企业风险承担行为的理解,丰富了企业行为理论的研究成果,对企业管理实践也有重要启示。

关 键 词:业绩期望落差  创新性行为  寻租性行为  CEO权力  独立董事监督  
收稿时间:2020-02-03

Innovating or Rent-seeking? Impact of Performance below Aspiration Level on Corporate Risk-taking Behavior
HE Qingqing YANG Liu PAN Zhen. Innovating or Rent-seeking? Impact of Performance below Aspiration Level on Corporate Risk-taking Behavior[J]. Business Economics and Administration, 2020, 40(7): 71-85
Authors:HE Qingqing YANG Liu PAN Zhen
Affiliation:School of Business, Nanjing Normal University
Abstract:Drawing on the behavioral theory of the firm and the theory of reference points, this paper explores the relationship between performance below aspiration level and the innovating and rent-seeking behavior of firms, and examines the moderating effect of CEO power and the supervision of independent directors. Based on the data of non-state-owned listed companies in the Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share manufacturing industries from 2013 to 2018, the research results show that when the aspiration reference point is dominated, with the increase of the aspiration gap, the firms' willingness to take long-term risks increases, and willingness to take short-term risks decreases. However, when survival reference points are initiated, the firm's survival is threatened, firm's long-term risk-taking willingness decreases and short-term risk-taking willingness increases. Therefore, the performance below aspiration level and innovating behavior shows an inverted U-shaped relationship that increases first and then decreases, and the rent-seeking behavior shows a U-shaped relationship that decreases first and then increases. Further study shows that CEO power flattens the U-shaped relationship between performance below aspiration level and rent-seeking behavior, and supervision of independent directors steepens the inverted U-shaped relationship between performance below aspiration level and innovating behavior. This research deepens the understanding of corporate risk-taking behavior under the condition of performance gap, enriches the research results of the behavioral theory of the firm, and has important implications for managerial practice.
Keywords:performance below aspiration level  innovating behavior  rent-seeking behavior  CEO power  supervision of independent directors  
点击此处可从《商业经济与管理》浏览原始摘要信息
点击此处可从《商业经济与管理》下载全文
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号