渠道合作情境下合同双元功能对主动和被动投机行为的影响差异研究

基于交易成本理论，在渠道合作情境下，以制造商的合同监督和企业间联合行动为工具测量合同治理的保障功能和协作功能，探讨二者对经销商主动投机行为和被动投机行为的影响差异。通过对512份问卷数据的统计分析，得到以下结论：第一，合同监督有助于抑制经销商的主动投机行为，但对其被动投机行为的影响不显著；第二，企业间联合行动有助于抑制经销商的被动投机行为，但对其主动投机行为的影响不显著；第三，经销商的主动投机行为和被动投机行为均会负向影响合作绩效；第四，经销商的主动投机行为中介合同监督对合作绩效的正向影响，被动投机行为中介企业间联合行动对合作绩效的正向影响。

Managing Different Types of Opportunism by the Dual Function of Contract in a Channel Cooperation Context

Drawing on transaction cost theory, this study explores the different effects of the safeguarding function of contracts, operationalized as contract monitoring, and the coordinating function of contracts, operationalized as interfirm joint action, on the distributor's active versus passive opportunistic behaviors in the context of manufacturer-distributor channel relationship. By analyzing the data collected from 512 manufacturers, we find that, first, contract monitoring inhibits distributor's active opportunistic behavior, but it does not have significant impact on the distributor's passive opportunistic behavior. Second, joint action deters the distributor's passive opportunistic behavior, but it does not have significant influence on the distributor's active opportunistic behavior. Third, both the distributor's active and passive opportunistic behaviors negatively influence the cooperation performance. Fourth, the distributor's active opportunistic behavior mediates the positive relationship between contract monitoring and cooperation performance; the distributor's passive opportunistic behavior mediates the positive relationship between joint action and cooperation performance.