平台经济视域下的商家投机行为治理——基于平台主动治理视角

平台型网络市场的虚拟性与隐蔽性导致商家隐瞒、欺骗消费者的行为愈演愈烈,衍生了新的治理难题。基于交易成本理论和社会交换理论,立足平台主动治理视角,文章探索平台主动治理中的事前商家规范机制、事中交易保障机制和事后争议处理机制对商家强、弱投机行为的影响,以及平台声誉对其影响的调节作用。基于消费者视角开展问卷调查,对数据进行结构方程模型分析和分层回归分析,结果表明：弱投机行为对强投机行为具有显著正向影响;商家规范机制和争议处理机制对强、弱投机行为均具有抑制作用;而交易保障机制对弱投机行为具有促进作用;平台声誉对交易保障机制、争议处理机制和弱投机行为之间的关系具有负向调节作用。

Governance of Sellers’ Speculation Behavior in Platform Economy from the Perspective of Platform Active Governance

The virtuality and concealment of platform mediated network market enable sellers to hide and cheat consumers more conveniently, which leads to new governance problems. Based on transaction cost theory and social exchange theory, focusing on the perspective of platform active governance, this paper explored the influence of sellers regulation mechanism, transaction security mechanism and dispute settlement mechanism on the strong and weak speculation, and the moderating effect of platform reputation. The questionnaire survey was used to collect data from the perspective of consumers. Structural equation modeling and hierarchical regression analysis were used to analyze the data. The results show that weak speculation has a significant positive impact on strong speculation. Seller regulation mechanism and dispute settlement mechanism both have inhibitory effect on strong and weak speculation. Transaction security mechanism has positive impact on weak speculation. Platform reputation has a negative moderating effect on the relationship between transaction security mechanism, dispute settlement mechanism and weak speculation.