| 晋升激励与中国经济增长研究综述 |
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| 引用本文： | 田伟,.晋升激励与中国经济增长研究综述[J].华东经济管理,2011,25(11):43-48. |
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| 作者姓名： | 田伟 |
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| 作者单位： | 中共江苏省委党校,江苏南京210004;南京大学经济学院,江苏 南京210093 |
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| 摘 要： | 政治晋升是中国地方官员治理的重要内容。如何从晋升激励的视角出发阐释地方政府的经济行为，从而对中国经济增长进行“政治——经济”的分析，这正受到越来越多经济学者的关注。文章结合中国地方官员治理机制中与政治晋升相关的三方面重要制度安排（晋升集权、相对绩效考核、隐性治理机制），对晋升激励增长绩效的经济学文献进行了一个系统的梳理。
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| 关 键 词： | 晋升激励 地方官员行为 经济增长 |
Literature Review on Political Promotion Incentive and China s Economic Growth Research |
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| TIAN Wei;.Literature Review on Political Promotion Incentive and China s Economic Growth Research[J].East China Economic Management,2011,25(11):43-48. |
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| Authors: | TIAN Wei; |
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| Institution: | 1. Jiangsu CPC Party School; Nanjing 210004; China; 2.School of Economics; Nanjing University; Nanjing 210093; China |
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| Abstract: | Political promotion ＂plays an important role in local government official＇s governance. How to carry on a political-economy analysis of China＇ s economic growth by investigating local government＇ s economic behavior from the angle of political promotion incentive is attracting more and more economists＇ attention. Based on three important institutional arrange- ments of China＇ s local government official＇ s political promotion （including centralization of promotion; relative performance evaluation and implicit governance mechanism）, this article gives a systemic survey on economics research of China＇s political promotion incentive and its growth performance. |
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| Keywords: | political promotion incentive local government official s behavior economic growth |
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