| 基于政府利益行为的土地出让市场博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 陈荃,谭大璐.基于政府利益行为的土地出让市场博弈分析[J].经济研究导刊,2012(32):41-42,85. |
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| 作者姓名： | 陈荃 谭大璐 |
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| 作者单位： | 四川大学建筑与环境学院 |
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| 摘 要： | 中央政府与部分地方行政部门在土地出让市场上存在明显的利益目标差异。通过分析双方各自的利益诉求,建立了土地出让问题上的利益博弈模型。基于博弈分析的结论,提出除了要使地方行政部门在被查处后所遭受的损失大大超过其违规得益外,还应构建更具效力的监管激励机制,才能改变目前土地市场的非正常局面。
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| 关 键 词： | 土地出让 监管 利益博弈 中央政府 地方行政部门 |
Analysis of the land transfer market game based on the interests of the government behavior |
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| CHEN Quan,TAN Da-lu.Analysis of the land transfer market game based on the interests of the government behavior[J].Economic Research Guide,2012(32):41-42,85. |
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| Authors: | CHEN Quan TAN Da-lu |
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| Institution: | (Architecture and environment college,Sichuan university,Chengdu 610065,China) |
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| Abstract: | The central government and the local administrative departments in the land market has the obvious benefit goal difference.Through the analysis of their respective interests,built land transfer issue of benefit game model.Based on the analysis of game theory the conclusion,proposed that in addition to the local administrative departments was investigated loss suffered greatly exceeded the illegal profit,also should build more effective supervision incentive mechanism,to change the current land market abnormal situation. |
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| Keywords: | land transfer supervision interest game central government local administration |
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