Alternating-offer bargaining over menus under incomplete information |
| |
Authors: | Roman Inderst |
| |
Institution: | (1) London School of Economics, Department of Economics, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, UK (e-mail: r.inderst@ucl.ac.uk) , GB |
| |
Abstract: | Summary. This paper considers bargaining with one-sided private information and alternating offers where an agreement specifies both
a transfer and an additional (sorting) variable. Moreover, both sides can propose menus. We show that for a subset of parameters
the alternating-offer game has a unique equilibrium where efficient contracts are implemented in the first period. This stands
in sharp contrast to the benchmarks of contract theory, where typically only the uninformed side proposes, and bargaining
theory, where typically the agreement only specifies a transfer.
Received: September 10, 2001; revised version: March 25, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" I benefitted from discussions with Benny Moldovanu, Holger Müller, and Roland Strausz, and from comments made by an
anonymous referee. |
| |
Keywords: | and Phrases:Screening Bargaining |
本文献已被 SpringerLink 等数据库收录! |
|