Rent Seeking and Government Ownership of Firms: An Application to China's Township–Village Enterprises |
| |
Authors: | Che Jiahua |
| |
Institution: | Department of Economics, University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign, 328 David Kinley Hall, Urbana, Illinois, 61801, f1 |
| |
Abstract: | Using its control of regulated inputs, a government agency extracts rents from a manager who undertakes an investment. Such government rent-seeking activity leads to a typical hold-up problem. Government ownership serves as a second-best commitment mechanism, through which the government agency will restrain itself from the rent-seeking activity and may even offer the manager assistance in the form of tax breaks and subsidies. This mechanism works at a cost, however, as government ownership also compromises ex post managerial incentives and creates distortion in resource allocation. Nevertheless, government ownership Pareto dominates private ownership under certain conditions. These conditions correspond to a host of stylized empirical observations concerning local-government-owned firms, i.e., township–village enterprises, during China's transition to a market economy.J. Comp. Econ., June 2002 30(4), pp. 787–811. Department of Economics, University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign, 328 David Kinley Hall, Urbana, Illinois 61801. © 2002 Association for Comparative Economic Studies. Published by Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D23, D72, L33. |
| |
Keywords: | |
本文献已被 ScienceDirect 等数据库收录! |
|