| Abstract: | Most previous research on the economics of information has been based on the expected utility hypothesis and Bayesian learning. Yet there is experimental evidence that decision makers do not always maximize expected utility and that human learning is not always consistent with Bayes' rule. Using a two-period model, this paper examines the valuation of information as well as the demanf for information in the broader context of a state preference approach under an ordinal representation of preferences. In particular, it is not assumed that the decision maker is Bayesian, nor that he behaves in a way consistent with the expected utility hypothesis. In this general framework, the value of information is defined and analysed. Also, under active learning, the optimal allocation of information gathering activities is discussed. Behavioural properties of the demand for information are derived making use of a compensation function. Implications of the results for measuring the value of information and for the economic analysis of learning activities are discussed. |
