Co-development ventures: Optimal time of entry and profit-sharing |
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Authors: | Jakša Cvitani? Sonja Radas |
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Institution: | a Caltech, Humanities and Social Sciences, MC 228-77, 1200 E. California Blvd. Pasadena, CA 91125, United States b The Institute of Economics, Zagreb, Trg J. F. Kennedy 7, 10000 Zagreb, Croatia c Department of Mathematics, University of Zagreb, Croatia |
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Abstract: | We find the optimal time for entering a joint venture by two firms, and the optimal linear contract for sharing the profits. We consider risk-sharing, timing-incentive and asymmetric decisions contract designs. If the firms are risk-neutral and the cash payments are allowed, all three designs are equivalent. With risk aversion, the optimal contract parameters may vary significantly across the three designs and across varying levels of risk aversion. We also analyze a dataset of joint biomedical ventures, in which, in agreement with our theoretical predictions, both royalty and cash payments are mostly increasing in the smaller firm's experience, and the time of entry happens sooner for more experienced small firms. |
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Keywords: | Real options Joint ventures Contracts |
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