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Firm competition and incentive pay: Rent seeking at work
Authors:Mikael Priks
Institution:
  • Department of Economics, Stockholm University, 106 91 Stockholm, Sweden
  • Abstract:Empirical evidence shows that competition among firms generates steep incentives inside firms. Incentive pay stimulates productive investments but may generate inefficient rent-seeking investments. I show that competition reduces firms’ profits and thereby the inefficient investments, which makes steep incentives attractive.
    Keywords:J2  J3
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