First-price sealed-bid auctions when bidders exhibit different attitudes toward risk |
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| Authors: | Franç ois Maré chal,Pierre-Henri Morand |
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| Affiliation: | a CRESE, University of Franche-Comté, 30 avenue de l’observatoire, BP 1559, 25 009 Besançon cedex, Franceb CRESE, University of Franche-Comté, France |
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| Abstract: | When bidders have different risk aversion levels, we determine in a first-price auction, the asymmetric equilibrium strategies. We analyze the impact of asymmetric risk aversion levels on bidders’ markups and on the expected revenue and allocative efficiency of the auction. |
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| Keywords: | D44 D81 |
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