Formal models of the political resource curse |
| |
Authors: | Desiree A Desierto |
| |
Institution: | 1.WSD Handa Center for Human Rights and International Justice,Stanford University,Stanford,USA;2.Department of Political Science,University of Wisconsin-Madison,Madison,USA |
| |
Abstract: | By surveying formal models, I demonstrate that the political resource curse is the misallocation of revenues from natural resources and other windfall gains by political agents. I show that the curse always exists if political agents are rent-seeking, since mechanisms of government accountability, e.g. electoral competition, the presence of political challengers, and even the threat of violent conflict, are inherently imperfect. However, the scope for rent-seeking becomes more limited as the competition over political power that threatens the incumbent government becomes more intense. |
| |
Keywords: | |
本文献已被 SpringerLink 等数据库收录! |
|