| 盈余管理寻租的博弈分析与治理 |
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| 引用本文： | 刘启亮,张雅曼,谈丽华,刘晶莹. 盈余管理寻租的博弈分析与治理[J]. 财会通讯, 2011, 0(9) |
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| 作者姓名： | 刘启亮 张雅曼 谈丽华 刘晶莹 |
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| 作者单位： | 武汉大学经济与管理学院; |
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| 基金项目： | 教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目“投资者保护、诚信与盈余管理”(项目编号:08JC630060)的阶段性成果 |
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| 摘 要： | 本文通过静态模型和两阶段动态博弈模型,从上市公司和注册会计师两方分析了盈余管理的寻租条件与合谋寻租本质,并提出了相应的治理建议。
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| 关 键 词： | 盈余管理 寻租 治理 |
Game Analysis of Rent-Seeking in EM and Governance Advice |
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| Liu Qiliang Zhang Yaman Tan Lihua Liu Jingying. Game Analysis of Rent-Seeking in EM and Governance Advice[J]. Communication of Finance and Accounting, 2011, 0(9) |
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| Authors: | Liu Qiliang Zhang Yaman Tan Lihua Liu Jingying |
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| Affiliation: | Liu Qiliang Zhang Yaman Tan Lihua Liu Jingying(School of Economics and Management,Wuhan University,Wuhan,Hubei 430072) |
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| Abstract: | This paper uses the static model and two-stage dynamic game model to analyze the conditions of rent-seeking in earnings management(EM) and the nature of conspiracy rent-seeking from the perspectives of both listed company and the certified public accountant.We also propose some governance recommendations. |
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| Keywords: | EM Rent-Seeking Governance advice |
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