Opportunism,incentives, and the m-form hypothesis: A laboratory study |
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| Institution: | 1. School of Business, Macau University of Science and Technology, Taipa, Macau;2. Department of Computer and Information Science, University of Macau, Macau;3. Faculty of Software and Information Science, Iwate Prefectural University, Iwate, Japan;1. Telecom Paris, Institut Polytechnique de Paris;2. Politecnico di Torino, DIGEP; EUI - Florence School of Regulation;3. Nova School of Business & Economics, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Campus de Carcavelos, Carcavelos 2775-405, Portugal;4. Boston University, Department of Economics, Boston, MA |
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| Abstract: | Opportunism is one central premise of the M-form hypothesis. This premise is investigated in a laboratory experiment using M-form and U-form organizations under incentives based on corporate profit and divisional profits. There was greater opportunism under U-form organization than under the M-form, and under divisional profit than under corporate profit incentives. Additionally, a misguided altruism lead a number of individuals to misrepresent information. The M-form yields higher performance than the U-form. Also, corporate profit incentives yield higher total profit than divisional profit incentives. The results partially explain why empirical studies do not strongly support the M-form hypothesis. |
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