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Asset sales and takeover threats
Institution:1. Institute of Banking and Finance, HEC - University of Lausanne, 1015 Lausanne/VD, Switzerland;2. Faculty of Economics, University of Kragujevac, Djure Pucara 3, 34000 Kragujevac, Serbia;3. Faculty of Science, University of Kragujevac, Radoja Domanovi?a 12, 34000 Kragujevac, Serbia;4. Faculty of Economics, University of Belgrade, Kameni?ka 6, 11000 Beograd, Serbia;5. National Bank of Serbia, Kralja Petra 12, 11000 Beograd, Serbia;6. CESIfo, Munich, Germany;7. School of Business, Management and Economics, University of Sussex, Sussex House, Falmer, Brighton, BN1 9RH UK
Abstract:This research addresses the question of whether the existence of a recent takeover threat affects the market reaction to a subsequent sale of assets. The effect of a prior takeover threat on the stock price reaction to an asset sale is examined from the perspective of both the buying firm and the selling firm. The total gains to the transaction are estimated as a market weighted average of the abnormal returns to the two firms. The results show that when there has not been a recent takeover threat on the selling firm, abnormal returns are significantly positive for the seller, the buyer and in total. However, if the selling firm has faced a takeover threat within the previous year, the abnormal returns upon announcement of an asset sale are insignificant for the seller, negative for the buyer, and negative for a portfolio of the two. Hence, the market has a lower estimate of the overall gains in transactions that follow takeover threats on the selling firm; in fact, these transactions result in a net wealth reduction.
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