Symmetric Separating Equilibria in English Auctions |
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| Institution: | 1. Anderson Graduate School of Management, University of California, Los Angeles, California, 90095;2. Department of Economics, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, Wisconsin, 53706;3. Department of Economics, University of California, Los Angeles, California, 90095;1. Department of Asian and Policy Studies, The Education University of Hong Kong, 10 Lo Ping Road, Tai Po, New Territories, Hong Kong;2. Department of Economics, The University of Texas at Austin, 2225 Speedway, Austin, TX, 78712, USA;1. Bielefeld University, Department of Business Administration and Economics, Germany;2. Institute of Accounting and Taxation, University of Graz, Austria;3. Department of Accounting and Taxation, University of Mannheim, Germany;1. Department of Economics, London School of Economics, Houghton Street, London, United Kingdom, WC2A 2AE;2. Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University and Institute of Economics and Business, Beihang University, VU Station B #351819, Nashville, TN 37235-1819, United States;3. Department of Economics, National University of Singapore, 1 Arts Link, 117570, Singapore |
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| Abstract: | We characterize the set of perfect Bayesian equilibria in symmetric separating strategies in the model of English auctions given by P. R. Milgrom and R. J. Weber (1982, Econometrica50, 1089–1122). There is a continuum of such equilibria. The equilibrium derived by Milgrom and Weber is that in which bids are maximal. Only in the case of pure private values does a restriction to weakly undominated strategies select a unique equilibrium. This has important implications for empirical studies of English auctions, particularly outside the pure private values paradigm. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D44, D82. |
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