Kleptocracy and revolutions

This paper develops an economic theory of revolutions as manifestationsof kleptocratic rivalry. The theory implies that whether ornot a revolution occurs and, if a revolution occurs, the probabilitythat it will be successful depends on the current realizationsof the stochastic factors, such as the current potential revolutionaryleader's skill in organizing a revolution, that determine theexpected effectiveness of insurgents relative to the ruler'ssoldiers. But, the theory also implies that, given the currentrealization of the expected effectiveness of insurgents, moreis spent on deterring revolutions that do not occur, and revolutionswhen they occur consume more resources, the larger is the valueof being the kleptocratic ruler. Unsurprisingly, some of those who suffered for the cause, inexile or underground, now feel they deserve their just rewards:good salaries, nice cars, patronage, and perks. (Timothy GartonAsh, 'The Curse and Blessing of South Africa', The New YorkReview of Books, August 14, 1997, page 10.)