Adaptive learning in extensive form games and sequential equilibrium |
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Authors: | Ebbe Groes Hans Jørgen Jacobsen Birgitte Sloth |
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Institution: | (1) Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen, DK-1455 Copenhagen K, DENMARK, DK |
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Abstract: | Summary. This paper studies adaptive learning in extensive form games and provides conditions for convergence points of adaptive learning
to be sequential equilibria. Precisely, we present a set of conditions on learning sequences such that an assessment is a
sequential equilibrium if and only if there is a learning sequence fulfilling the conditions, which leads to the assessment.
Received: November 5, 1996; revised version: May 28, 1997 |
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Keywords: | JEL Classification Numbers: C72 D83 |
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