| 上市公司管理层持股的激励效用及影响因素 |
| |
| 引用本文： | 于东智,谷立日. 上市公司管理层持股的激励效用及影响因素[J]. 经济理论与经济管理, 2001, 0(9): 24-30 |
| |
| 作者姓名： | 于东智 谷立日 |
| |
| 作者单位： | 东北财经大学研究生部 大连116025 |
| |
| 摘 要： | 持股权合约是协调管理层与股东利益的关键治理机制。中国上市公司高级管理人员的持股比例偏低,起不到应有的激励效果,上市公司在制定管理层持股权合约的数量时并没有考虑到依据经济学原理对最优合约数量做出规定。应依据现代科学(经济学、行为学与管理学等)的原理,结合各企业自身实际情况制定最优的持股权合约。
|
| 关 键 词： | 持股权 公司绩效 激励效用 治理效率 |
| 文章编号： | 1000-596X(2001)09-0024-07 |
| 收稿时间： | 2001-06-27 |
| 修稿时间： | 2001-06-27 |
INFLUENCING FACTORS OF MANAGERIAL OWNERSHIP AND EFFECTIVENESS OF STIMULATION |
| |
| YU Dong-zhi,GU Li-ri. INFLUENCING FACTORS OF MANAGERIAL OWNERSHIP AND EFFECTIVENESS OF STIMULATION[J]. Economic Theory and Business Management, 2001, 0(9): 24-30 |
| |
| Authors: | YU Dong-zhi GU Li-ri |
| |
| Affiliation: | Northeastern finance and economics university, Dalian 116025, China |
| |
| Abstract: | contracts of managerial ownership is a pivotal governance mechanism that harmonizes the advantage of management and shareholders. Managerial ownership is very low in PLC of China. It doesn't have efficiency that it should have.PLC does not formulate the most excellent contract amount according to the economics principle. PLC Should formulate amount of managerial ownership according to the principle of modern science (economics, behaviors and management etc), combining circumstance of each enterpriseself. |
| |
| Keywords: | Managerial Ownership Corporate Performance Effectiveness of Stimulation Governance Efficiency |
| 本文献已被 CNKI 万方数据 等数据库收录！ |
| 点击此处可从《经济理论与经济管理》浏览原始摘要信息 |
|
点击此处可从《经济理论与经济管理》下载全文 |
