Social norms and the indirect evolution of conditional cooperation |
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Authors: | Email author" target="_blank">Christian?TraxlerEmail author Mathias?Spichtig |
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Institution: | (1) Department of Behavioral Science, Hokkaido University, N10W7, Kita-ku, Sapporo 060-0810, Japan;(2) Department of Psychology, University of Pennsylvania, 3720 Walnut St., Philadelphia, PA 19104, USA |
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Abstract: | We develop a model of social norms and cooperation in large societies. Within this framework we use an indirect evolutionary
approach to study the endogenous formation of preferences and the co-evolution of norm compliance. The multiplicity of equilibria,
which emerges in the presence of social norms, is linked to the evolutionary analysis: individuals face situations where many
others cooperate as well as situations where a majority free-rides. The evolutionary adaptation to such heterogenous environments
favors conditional cooperators, who condition their pro-social behavior on the others’ cooperation. As conditional cooperators
react flexibly to their social environment, they dominate free-riders as well as unconditional cooperators. |
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