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盈余信息相关性悖论
引用本文:隋立秋,刘晓彦.盈余信息相关性悖论[J].石家庄经济学院学报,2009,32(6):64-66.
作者姓名:隋立秋  刘晓彦
作者单位:中央财经大学,会计学院,北京,100081
摘    要:悖论分为两个层次:逻辑不一致和信号选择偏误。盈余信息满足以下条件时具有相关性:(1)合理地诠释了经济利润;(2)符合各契约主体的信息要求。盈余信息满足条件(1)时,具有基础相关性;盈余信息满足条件(2)时,具有博弈相关性;同时满足两个条件时,盈余信息具备完备的相关性。提出了博弈相关性的两种形式:显式相关性和隐式相关性。引入显式相关性和隐式相关性后,解决了相关性的逻辑不一致,完善了盈余信息相关性理论。

关 键 词:相关性悖论  显示相关性  隐式相关性

Relevance Paradox of Earnings Information
SUI Li-qiu,LIU Xiao-yan.Relevance Paradox of Earnings Information[J].Journal of Shijiazhuang University of Economics,2009,32(6):64-66.
Authors:SUI Li-qiu  LIU Xiao-yan
Institution:(Central University of Finance & Economics, Beijing 100081 )
Abstract:The paradox is divided into two levels: the logical inconsistencies and signal selection bias.Earnings information will have relevance when it meets the following conditions:(1) earnings information is a reasonable interpretation of the economic profits;(2) earnings information is in line with the information request of each contractor.On the condition(1),earnings information has basic relevance;on the condition(2),earnings information has game relevance;on conditions of both,it has complete relevance.The game relevance is divided into two forms: obvious relevance and obscure relevance.After introducing obvious relevance and obscure relevance,this paper resolves the logical inconsistencies of relevance,improves the relevance theory of earnings information.
Keywords:relevance paradox  obvious relevance  obscure relevance
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