首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
     

机构投资者持股、高管激励与大股东掏空抑制
引用本文:赵国宇,翟秋玲. 机构投资者持股、高管激励与大股东掏空抑制[J]. 金融理论与实践, 2020, 0(2): 88-96
作者姓名:赵国宇  翟秋玲
作者单位:广东财经大学 会计学院,广东 广州 510320;广东财经大学 会计学院,广东 广州 510320
基金项目:广东省软科学研究计划;国家社会科学基金
摘    要:激励和监督是公司治理最基本的重要手段,从这两方面入手探讨机构投资者持股、高管激励对大股东掏空抑制的影响。研究发现,机构投资者持股不仅可以抑制大股东掏空行为,还可以增强高管激励的力度;此外,利用中介效应检验模型,还发现机构投资者抑制大股东掏空的路径,即机构投资者主要通过高管激励中介影响大股东掏空行为。研究结论可以丰富公司治理的研究问题,为解决现实中存在的大股东掏空行为提供借鉴。

关 键 词:证券市场  机构投资者  高管激励  掏空  中介效应

Institutional Ownership,Executive Incentive and Major Shareholder Tunneling Inhibition
Abstract:Incentive and supervision are the most important and important means of corporate gover-nance.From these two aspects,this paper discusses the influence of institutional investors'shareholding and executive incentive on the tunneling inhibition of major shareholders.This paper finds that institu-tional ownership can not only restrain the tunneling behavior of major shareholders,but also enhance the motivation of senior executives.In addition,this paper uses the mediation effect test model,and also finds the way that institutional investors restrain the tunneling of major shareholders,that is,institution-al investors mainly influence the tunneling behavior of major shareholders through executive incentives.The research conclusion of this paper can enrich the research problems of corporate governance and provide reference for solving the tunneling behavior of major shareholders.
Keywords:stock market  institutional investors  executive incentives  tunneling  mediation effect
本文献已被 维普 万方数据 等数据库收录!
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号