旅游项目投资资本介入研究——基于委托代理理论的视角

旅游项且投资的资本介入问题存在两层委托代理关系。其一是人民委托地方政府。其二为地方政府委托外部资本进行项目投资建设和经营，在此过程中，委托代理理论的逆向选择和道德风险问题相继出现，导致地方政府短视行为及寻租行为、外部资本对生态自然环境的破坏、对企业财务及投资信息的操控以及借旅游开发之名进行房地产开发等行为．基于委托代理理论，建议：优化地方政府旅游项目投资考核机制，建立科学的旅游资本介入评价指标体系，政府通过土地入股或保留一股黄金股保证对重大决策问题否决权．

Research on Capital Intervention of Tourism Project --from the view of Principal m Agent Theory

In the process of capital intervention in tourism projects, there are two levels of Principal-Agent relationships. The first level is the people-government relationship and the second level is the government-external capital relationship. The problem of adverse selection and moral hazard will rise in those two levels, which leads to the shortsighted and rent-seeking activities of the government and also results in some bad behaviors of the external capital, such as the destruction to natural environment, the hid- ing of financial and investment information and engagement to residential property development. The article probes into this prob- lem based on Principal-Agent theory, and gives some suggestions, including the optimization of government tourism development evaluation mechanism, the establishment of scientific external capital evaluation system and the keeping of a stream of golden shares by the government to ensure the veto rights to major decisions.