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Generic advertising without supply control: implications of funding mechanisms for advertising intensities in competitive industries
Authors:John W. Freebairn,&   Julian M. Alston
Affiliation:Department of Economics, the University of Melbourne, Australia.,;Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, University of California, Davis, USA.
Abstract:Producer profit-maximising rules for generic commodity advertising programs and associated funding levies are derived. Lump-sum, per unit and ad valorem levies, and government subsidy funding arrangements are compared and contrasted. The initial single-product competitive market model is extended to incorporate international trade, government price policies, and multiple commodity interactions.
Keywords:
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