| 基于Stackelberg博弈的供应链信用风险分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 王燕,邬跃,魏国辰.基于Stackelberg博弈的供应链信用风险分析[J].物流技术,2008,27(2):89-91. |
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| 作者姓名： | 王燕 邬跃 魏国辰 |
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| 作者单位： | 北京物资学院物流学院,北京,101149 |
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| 摘 要： | 讨论了由一个供应商和一个销售商组成的简单供应链,在销售商还款不确定的前提下,基于供应商和销售商订货过程是Stackelberg博弈,给出了他们的最优定价和订货策略,并说明了通过合理定价,供应商可以有效地防范信用风险;然后分析了销售商违约对供销双方及供应链的影响,并通过算例进行了说明。
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| 关 键 词： | 供应链 信用风险 Stackelberg博弈 定价 订货 |
| 文章编号： | 1005-152X（2008）02-0089-03 |
| 收稿时间： | 2007-10-25 |
| 修稿时间： | 2007年10月25 |
Analysis on Credit Risk in SC Based on Stackelberg Game |
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| WANG Yan,WU Yue,WEI Guo-chen.Analysis on Credit Risk in SC Based on Stackelberg Game[J].Logistics Technology,2008,27(2):89-91. |
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| Authors: | WANG Yan WU Yue WEI Guo-chen |
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| Abstract: | The paper discusses a simple supply chain with one supplier and one retailer and analyzes the impact of retailer's default in supplier and retailer as well as the entire SC.If the retailer's payment is uncertain,the optimal order quantity and the optimal price are given on the Stackelberg game between the supplier and retailer.The supplier can effectively avoid credit risk by rational pricing. |
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| Keywords: | SC credit risk Stackelberg game pricing order |
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