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密封招标效率的博弈分析
引用本文:王宗胜,吴剑平,李荣.密封招标效率的博弈分析[J].西安财经学院学报,2003,16(6):81-84.
作者姓名:王宗胜  吴剑平  李荣
作者单位:云南财贸学院,工商管理学院,云南,昆明,650221
摘    要:招标是一种常用的市场交易方式,集中竞争的特点使其能有效地配置资源。二级密封价格招标在一定条件下,由于其制度设计符合“激励相容”约束条件,从而能有效地促使竞买者“说实话”,减少了道德风险,降低了交易费用。因此,二级密封价格招标是比一级密封价格招标更有效率的方式,对它的研究具有重要的理论与实践意义。

关 键 词:基本建设  工程招标  国有资产管理  博弈分析  一级密封价格招标  二级密封价格招标
文章编号:1672-2817(2003)06-0081-04
修稿时间:2003年7月4日

An Analysis of Gaming on the Efficiency of Sealed Bidding
WANG Zong-sheng,WU Jian-ping,LI Rong.An Analysis of Gaming on the Efficiency of Sealed Bidding[J].Journal of Xi‘an Institute of Finance & Economics,2003,16(6):81-84.
Authors:WANG Zong-sheng  WU Jian-ping  LI Rong
Abstract:As a usual means of market bargaining, bidding can effectively distribute resource owing to its intensive competition. The second-price sealed bidding can effectively prompt bidders to tell the truth, decrease moral hazard and reduce transaction cost because its institution planning properly accord with the condition of incentive compatibility constraint. So we can say that the second-price sealed bidding is more efficient than the first-price sealed bidding. Therefore, it is important to research in this field.
Keywords:the second-price sealed bidding  incentive compatibility  game  
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