Greening transportation fleets: Insights from a two-stage game theoretic model |
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Authors: | Sang Hoo Bae Joseph Sarkis Chung Sik Yoo |
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Affiliation: | aDepartment of Economics, Clark University, 950 Main Street, Worcester, MA 01610-1477, United States;bGraduate School of Management, Clark University, 950 Main Street, Worcester, MA 01610-1477, United States;cDepartment of Economics, Yonsei University, 234 Maeji Wonju Kangwon, South Korea |
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Abstract: | The greening of organizational transportation fleets, especially trucks and automobiles, has gained increasing attention by companies in a variety of industrial sectors. The reasons for this concern and attention are due to regulatory and competitive pressures, but also increasing costs of fossil-fuels. Surprisingly the amount of research and modeling for fleet management overall has been rather limited, with the focus on managing green vehicle investments virtually non-existent. In this study we develop a two-stage game theoretic model that helps evaluate, from both policy and organizational perspectives, the implications of greening of transportation fleets. Various parameters are evaluated including factors such as innovations in green vehicle technology, levels of service differences, cost of fuel, adjusting tax policy, regulatory compliance requirements, and adaptation costs. This evaluation provides practical insights into actions that could be considered by regulators and organizations to encourage environmental investments. |
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Keywords: | Transportation fleet management Environmental Game theory Regulatory policy Investment justification |
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