| 我国社保基金投资监管的博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 袁仙品 周明. 我国社保基金投资监管的博弈分析[J]. 新疆财经学院学报, 2005, 0(4): 11-14 |
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| 作者姓名： | 袁仙品 周明 |
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| 作者单位： | [1]西北大学,陕西西安710069 [2]新疆财经学院,新疆乌鲁木齐830012 |
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| 摘 要： | 社保基金投资运营各方之间的博弈行为变异，导致了我国社保基金投资监管的低效，根本原因在于监管体系组织结构失衡和相关法律法规缺失。监管组织模式的调整符合我国社保基金投资监管模式的实际。
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| 关 键 词： | 社保基金 监管博弈 组织结构 |
| 文章编号： | 1671-9840(2005)04-0011-04 |
| 收稿时间： | 2005-09-06 |
| 修稿时间： | 2005-09-06 |
Game Analysis on Supervising Investment of Social Security Fund |
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| YUAN Xian- pin, ZHOU Ming. Game Analysis on Supervising Investment of Social Security Fund[J]. Journal of Xinjiang Finance & Economy Institute, 2005, 0(4): 11-14 |
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| Authors: | YUAN Xian- pin ZHOU Ming |
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| Abstract: | The variation of circle sider's game behavior is the reason that supervision and management of social security fund investment in China is low efficiency.The fundamental reason is the imperfect organizational structure of supervision and management system and absent correlative law.Therefore,the author put forward some suggestion to reform organizational pattern. |
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| Keywords: | Social Security Fund Supervision and Management Game Organizational Structure |
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