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寡头垄断企业技术创新最佳技术含量的博弈分析
引用本文:郭三党,刘思峰,方志耕. 寡头垄断企业技术创新最佳技术含量的博弈分析[J]. 科技进步与对策, 2007, 24(7): 111-114
作者姓名:郭三党  刘思峰  方志耕
作者单位:南京航空航天大学,江苏,南京,210016
摘    要:构建了双寡头垄断企业技术创新的收益函数和博弈模型,对双寡头垄断竞争企业的技术创新进行了定量分析,并与两企业合作创新的情况作对比,说明企业的技术创新有一个最佳的技术含量,而且技术含量越高的行业,越容易形成寡头垄断;并推翻了以往模型中得出的认为不合作对社会更有效率的说法。提出应鼓励企业,尤其是创新空间很大的企业之间进行合作,而不是一味地提倡竞争,并对模型进行了实例研究。

关 键 词:寡头垄断  技术创新  博弈  最佳技术含量
文章编号:1001-7348(2007)07-0111-04
修稿时间:2006-07-11

Game Analysis of the Best Technological Contents of Oligopsony Enterprise''''s Technological Innovation
Guo San-dang,Liu Si-feng,Fang Zhi-geng. Game Analysis of the Best Technological Contents of Oligopsony Enterprise''''s Technological Innovation[J]. Science & Technology Progress and Policy, 2007, 24(7): 111-114
Authors:Guo San-dang  Liu Si-feng  Fang Zhi-geng
Abstract:In this paper, the author constructs double oligopsony enterprise income function and static cournot game model of technological innovation, quantitatively analyze the technological innovation of double oligopsony enterprise, and show that there is a best technological contents in the technological innovations of enterprises, and industries which have higher technology contents easy form oligopsony ; furthermore it has overthrown the statement obtained in the past model that noncooperation were more efficient to the society, propose encourag/ng enterprises, especially with very big innovative space, to cooperate, but not compete blindly. And case study is carried on to study the model.
Keywords:oligopoly   technical innovation    game   best technical contents
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