国有银行注资与剥离不良资产的经济学分析

本文构建了一个国有银行的选择贷款对象的博弈模型,从理论上分析了国有银行的不良资产具有一种自增强机制,从而导致国有银行贷款被“锁定”在低效率扩张路径中。国家对国有银行注资和剥离国有银行的不良资产是打破不良资产自增强机制、提高国有银行贷款配置效率的前提条件和合理选择。

The Economic Analysis on Investment and Stripping off the Bad Assets from State-owned Banks

The article theoretically analyses that the bad assets of state-owned banks have self-extension system whic h in turn gives rise to loans of state -o wned banks chained on the low-efficient expansion path,by establishing a game theory model of choosing a loan object by state-owned banks. The governme nt investment and stripping off the b ad as-sets from the state-owned banks are t he prerequisite and rational choice for breaking the self-extension system of bad assets and enhancing the loans' allocative efficiency of state-owned banks.