首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
     检索      


Power fluctuations and political economy
Authors:Daron Acemoglu  Mikhail Golosov  Aleh Tsyvinski
Institution:a MIT, United States
b CIFAR, Canada
c Yale University, Department of Economics, Box 208268, New Haven, CT, United States
d NES, Russia
Abstract:We study (constrained) Pareto efficient allocations in a dynamic production economy where the group that holds political power decides the allocation of resources. For high discount factors, the economy converges to a first-best allocation where labor supply decisions are not distorted. For low discount factors, distortions do not disappear and fluctuate over time. Most importantly, the set of sustainable first-best allocations is larger when there is less persistence in the identity of the party in power (because this encourages political compromise). This result contradicts the common presumption that there will be fewer distortions when there is a “stable ruling group”.
Keywords:P16  P48
本文献已被 ScienceDirect 等数据库收录!
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号