花落谁家-高考志愿填报机制的博弈模型

该文分析了高考志愿填报三种不同机制(即考前报、估分报和知分报)下,考生之间策略决策的纳什均衡结果,以此来评估三种制度在人才筛选方面的效率.我们发现,三种填报机制之间不存在帕累托改进.但在许多情况下,考前报和估分报可能达成社会应有效率,其中又以考前报可能性更大,此外更大范围内的竞争也有利于消除投机激励.关键的参数包括考生正常发挥的概率和对不同学校评价的差异度.

WHERE HAVE ALL THE FLOWERS GONE--AN ANALYSIS OF THE NATIONAL COLLEGE ENTRANCE EXAM

THIS PAPER DISCUSSES THE THREE APPLICATION MECHANISMS OF COLLEGE ENTRANCE EXAM,I.E .APPLYING BEFORE EXAM,AFTER EXAM YET BEFORE SCORE ANNOUNCEMENT ,AND AFTER SCORE ANNOUNCEMENT . WE GIVE THE NASH EQUILIBRIUM OUTCOMES AND EVALUATE THE COMPARATIVE EFFICIENCY OF THE THREE SCHEMES . WE FIND THAT THERE DOES NOT EXIST PARETOI MPROVEMENT AMONG ALL THREE .BUT IN MANY CASES THE FIRST TWO CAN ACHIEVE SOCIAL EFFICIENCY . COMPETITION HELPS TO ELI MINATE THE INCENTIVE TO ARBITRATE . THE PAPER SHEDS LIGHTS ON THE SCREENIN...