Repetition, Communication, and Coordination Failure |
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Authors: | Gregory M Parkhurst Jason F Shogren Chris Bastian |
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Institution: | 1. Department of Agricultural Economics, Mississipi State University, Mississippi State, MS, 39762-5187, USA 2. Department of Economics, University of Wyoming, Laramie, WY, 82071-3985, USA 3. Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics, University of Wyoming, Laramie, WY, 80271-3354, USA
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Abstract: | We examine repetition as an institution that affects coordination failure in a game with and without pre-play communication. We use probit regression with random effects to test hypotheses regarding the frequency and form of coordination failure in the presence of repeated play versus one-shot games. Our results indicate that repetition without pre-play communication results in a lower frequency of coordination failure relative to one-shot game outcomes. This result is reversed when pre-play communication is allowed. Our evidence also suggests that repeated play coordination failures tend to be suboptimal Nash equilibria, whereas one-shot game coordination failures are disequilibria regardless of the presence of pre-play communication. |
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