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| 股份制公司兼并中补偿机制的非完全性问题研究 | |
| 引用本文： | 谢敏,魏许莲,周锋. 股份制公司兼并中补偿机制的非完全性问题研究[J]. 当代经济科学, 2001, 23(4): 49-52,69 |
| 作者姓名： | 谢敏 魏许莲 周锋 |
| 作者单位： | 1. 广东发展银行郑州分行,河南,郑州,450007 2. 湖南大学,湖南,长沙,410079 3. 华中科技大学,湖北,武汉,430074 |
| 摘 要： | 本文讲座股份公司之间进行兼并的效率问题。提出股份制下,公司兼并过程中,即使允许贿赂,无论是大股东还是经理决策,部分帕累托最优的兼并区域仍不能实现。也就是说,在股份制下,“金降落伞”补偿机制的非完全性是不可避免的。 |
| 关 键 词： | 帕累托最优 股份公司 补偿机制非完全性 企业兼并 |
| 文章编号： | 1002-2848(2001)04-0049-04 |
A Study On the Incompleteness of Compensation Mechanism in the Course of Merging Joint Stock Companies |
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| XIE Min,WEI Xu-lian,ZHOU Feng. A Study On the Incompleteness of Compensation Mechanism in the Course of Merging Joint Stock Companies[J]. Modern Economic Science, 2001, 23(4): 49-52,69 | |
| Authors: | XIE Min WEI Xu-lian ZHOU Feng |
| Abstract: | What is discussed in this paper is the efficiency in the course of merging joint stock companies. The author points out that under the joint stock system, even if bribery is allowed in the course of merging, Pareto-optimality can not be completely fulfilled, whether the big shareholder or manager be the decision-maker. In other words, under such system, the incompleteness of the compensation mechanism of "gold parachute" can not be avoided indeed. |
| Keywords: | Pareto-optimality merge bribery compensation mechanism |
| 本文献已被 CNKI 维普 万方数据 等数据库收录！ | |