Learning aspiration in repeated games |
| |
Authors: | In-Koo Cho Akihiko Matsui |
| |
Institution: | a Department of Economics, University of Illinois, 1206 S. 6th Street, Champaign, IL 61820, USA b Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo, Japan |
| |
Abstract: | We study infinitely repeated symmetric 2×2 games played by bounded rational agents who follow a simple rule of thumb: each agent continues to play the same action if the current payoff exceeds the average of the past payoffs, and switches to the other action with a positive probability otherwise. By applying the stochastic approximation technique, we characterize the asymptotic outcomes for all 2×2 games. In the prisoners’ dilemma game, for example, the players cooperate in the limit if and only if the gain from defecting against cooperation is “modest.” |
| |
Keywords: | D83 |
本文献已被 ScienceDirect 等数据库收录! |
|