Voting by committees under constraints |
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| Authors: | Salvador Barberà Alejandro Neme |
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| Institution: | a Departament d’Economia i d’Història Econòmica and CODE, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 08193, Cerdanyola del Vallès, Barcelona, Spain
b Instituto de Matemática Aplicada, Universidad Nacional de San Luis and CONICET, Ejército de los Andes 950, 5700, San Luis, Argentina |
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| Abstract: | We consider social choice problems where a society must choose a subset from a set of objects. Specifically, we characterize the families of strategy-proof voting procedures when not all possible subsets of objects are feasible, and voters’ preferences are separable or additively representable. |
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| Keywords: | D7 |
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