Collective choice under dichotomous preferences |
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Authors: | Anna Bogomolnaia Richard Stong |
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Institution: | a Department of Economics, MS 22, Rice University, P.O. Box 1892, Houston, TX 77251-1892, USA b Department of Mathematics, MS 136, Rice University, P.O. Box 1892, Houston, TX 77251-1892, USA |
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Abstract: | Agents partition deterministic outcomes into good or bad. A mechanism selects a lottery over outcomes (time-shares). The probability of a good outcome is the canonical utility. The utilitarian mechanism averages over outcomes with largest “approval”. It is efficient, strategyproof, anonymous and neutral.We reach an impossibility if, in addition, each agent's utility is at least , where n is the number of agents; or is at least the fraction of good to feasible outcomes. We conjecture that no ex ante efficient and strategyproof mechanism guarantees a strictly positive utility to all agents, and prove a weaker statement. |
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Keywords: | D71 C78 D63 |
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