Information transfer and aggregation in an uninformed committee: A model for the selection and use of biased expert advice |
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| Institution: | 1. California Institute of Technology, 1200 East California Blvd, Pasadena, CA 91125, United States;2. Calgent LLC, 11011 Torreyana Road, San Diego, CA 92121, United States;1. WZB, Reichpietschufer 50, 10785 Berlin, Germany;2. Department of Economics, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Spandauer Str. 1, 10178 Berlin, Germany;3. Department of Economics, University of Mannheim, L7 3-5, 68131 Mannheim, Germany;1. Department of Economics and Law, Sapienza University of Rome, Via del Castro Laurenziano 9, 00161, Rome, Italy;2. Italian Institute of Statistics (ISTAT), Via A. Depretis 72, 00184, Rome, Italy |
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| Abstract: | A committee of five uses majority rule for decisions on two public goods. Individual committee member preferences depend on a state of nature that is unknown to the committee members but the state of nature is known to two experts who have preferences about committee decisions. Experts have no vote on the committee but provide a recommendation to the committee at the opening of a meeting. Two experts who have known, opposing biases are selected – a dyadic mechanism. The results reveal that experts do not tell the truth but committee decisions are as if committee members know what the experts know. The information transfer occurs because committee members anticipate the biases and properly infer the information held by the experts. |
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